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Abstract 5	
Using dairy products as the case study of interest, the aim of the research is to explore the role 6	
of the media in food safety governance in China. Thematic content analysis is used to 7	
evaluate government and media reports (n = 233) on dairy related food safety incidents in 8	
China between 2004 and 2017 with differences identified between government and media 9	
reporting. The data is extracted from an online database (Zhichuchuangwai). The results show 10	
that the government performs better on exposing incidents earlier within the 14-year period 11	
but the news media plays a complementary role in food safety governance exposing a wider 12	
coverage of incidents. This study extends the current literature on the role of the news media 13	
in food safety governance in China by focusing on a single food sector (dairy), but on a 14	
national scale.   15	
Keywords food safety, disclosure, media, governance,  16	
Highlights 17	
• Food safety governance in China shows emergent hybrid characteristics. 18	
• Media communication has an important and complementary role in food safety 19	
governance. 20	





Recurrent food safety incidents in China have exerted a profound negative impact on 25	
consumer confidence and the wider international reputation of the Chinese food industry (Jia 26	
& Jukes, 2013; Peng, Li, Xia, Qi & Li, 2015; Liu & Ma, 2016). Since the 1990s, China has 27	
experienced both rapid industrialisation and urbanisation, causing great change in the food 28	
supply chain (Zhang & Xue, 2016). China’s food safety systems have a unique set of 29	
challenges to address including the countries geography and size, historical weak institutional 30	
governance and poor design of regulatory instruments and resource constraints, especially 31	
local regulatory resources (Holtkamp, Liu & McGuire, 2014) although steps have been taken 32	
to address the latter constraint in recent years.  33	
Milk is a commodity of interest in China when considering food safety, fraudulent 34	
behaviour (such as adulteration) and overall integrity in the food supply chain. What 35	
constitutes food safety is debated especially as wider definitions arise such as food defense, 36	
food fraud and adulteration. The World Health Organisation define foodborne disease as 37	
being the result of ingestion of foodstuffs contaminated with micro-organisms or chemicals 38	
(WHO, 2015). In this paper we consider food safety as encompassing this wider definition of 39	
harm caused by ingestion of food that is rendered harmful by a variety of means including 40	
presence of micro-organisms or chemicals or being affected by practices that could render the 41	
food harmful. There have been multiple incidents associated with the Chinese dairy sector 42	
including antibiotic contamination (year 2003); inadequate management of nutrition in infant 43	
formula (2004, 2005, 2012), recycling expired milk (2005), microbiological contamination 44	
(2005, 2008, 2011, 2012); melamine adulteration (2008); other illegal additions e.g. 45	
hydrolysed proteins (2009), detergent (2012); and mercury (2012) see Wu et al. (2018).  One 46	
of the most notorious food safety incidents in China is the 2008 melamine in milk scandal. 47	
Raw milk was diluted (adulterated) by adding water and melamine and the resultant high 48	
levels of melamine in milk products killed six children and poisoned around 300,000 49	
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consumers causing kidney stones and kidney failure (Pei et al. 2011; Holtkamp, Liu & 50	
McGuire, 2014; WHO, 2018).  As a result, domestic consumption of milk dropped 51	
significantly in China, product recalls were instituted and multiple countries prohibited the 52	
imports of all products containing Chinese milk powder (Xiu & Klein, 2010; Ortega, Wang, 53	
Olynk, Wu & Bai, 2011; Dong & Li, 2016). At the time of the melamine incident, Chinese 54	
milk supply was based on 200 million farmers living in remote and underdeveloped regions of 55	
China with an average herd size of less than ten cows and the associated supply consolidation 56	
activities of a network of milk traders, and village milk supply stations (Gale & Hu, 2009; Xiu 57	
& Klein, 2010; Pavlovich, Sinha & Rodrigues, 2016). The dairy sector has seen significant 58	
growth with the average annual milk consumption of Chinese citizens doubling between 2002 59	
and 2014, requiring integration of the supply chain, and leading to China after India and the 60	
United States of America (USA) now being the third largest global milk producing country 61	
(Wu et al. 2018). Further, Wu et al. (2018) argue dairy products from a food safety 62	
perspective are high risk, easily contaminated at multiple steps in the supply chain and if not 63	
suitably processed and refrigerated subject to rapid microbiological spoilage. Thus making 64	
dairy products commodities of interest in this study. 65	
Since the melamine incident, a decade ago, there is increasing focus on food safety 66	
governance in China and while the government is primarily responsible for controlling food 67	
safety, third-party bodies, especially news media, also contribute to wider governance 68	
structures (Cope et al. 2010; Zhang et al. 2015). In this context, governance encompasses “the 69	
culture and institutional environment in which citizens and stakeholders interact among 70	
themselves and participate in public affairs.” (UNESCO, 2017).  Governance is therefore 71	
more than simply describing the role of the government in food policy. Disclosure of 72	
information is an essential part of food safety governance (FAO & WHO, 2003) and while the 73	
government is often the most trusted source, the majority of Chinese consumers still receive 74	
information on food safety incidents from the media (Jin & Han, 2014; Peng, Li, Xia, Qi & 75	
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Li, 2015; Zhang, Xu, Oosterveer & Mol, 2016).  The sharp increase in Chinese media 76	
exposure of food safety incidents (Liu & Ma, 2016) shows the media’s role in food safety 77	
governance. However, there are several criticisms of their role for example, the potential for 78	
inaccuracy with media reports. In order to further improve food safety governance in China, it 79	
is arguably essential to understand the relationship between the government and the media in 80	
terms of the disclosure of information on food safety incidents and critique the efficacy of 81	
action. The aim of the research is to examine the role of news media in food safety 82	
governance in China specific emphasis on dairy products. 83	
The paper is structured as follows: firstly a review of relevant literature in order to 84	
identify the research gap. Then, the methodology is explained, and the results presented, 85	
interpreted and discussed. Finally, conclusions and recommendations are made which should 86	
support the further development of food safety governance in China and the effective 87	
disclosure of food safety information. 88	
2. Evolving models of safety governance  89	
Globalisation of food supply chains, growing economic power of retailers, decreasing 90	
confidence in government regulation, emerging ethical concerns among consumers, and 91	
recurrent food safety incidents means that hybridisation of food governance has occurred in 92	
two dimensions: firstly the national and international dimension; and secondly between 93	
government, producers and third-party organisations (Zhang, Qiao, Wang, Pu, Yu & Zheng, 94	
2015; Verbruggen, 2016; Verbruggen & Havinga, 2017). In this paper, the second dimension 95	
is the focus and specifically the role of government and third-party organisations in China. 96	
2.1 Official governance in China 97	
The Chinese regulatory food control system can be differentiated into: 1) food laws and 98	
regulations, 2) food control management, 3) inspection services, 4) laboratory services, and 5) 99	
information, education, communication and training (FAO & WHO, 2003). Food laws and 100	
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regulations can be divided into basic laws, subordinate laws and regulations, and provincial 101	
government regulations (Jia & Jukes, 2013) see Figure 1. By referencing the latest regime 102	
changes, the enforcement structure in China is presented (Figure 2 see Chen, Wang & Song, 103	
2015) highlighting inspection is conducted by local government at province, city and county 104	
level and laboratory services are provided at both national and local levels (Jia & Jukes, 105	
2013).  106	
Take in Figures 1 and 2 107	
As an increasingly essential part of the food control regime, communication is assigned to 108	
all main departments that are responsible for food safety governance: the China Food and 109	
Drug Administration (CFDA), Ministry of Health (MOH), Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), 110	
and Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) (FAO & 111	
WHO, 2003; Jia & Jukes, 2013; Zhou, 2017). Additionally, the information disclosure roles 112	
of each department are different (Figure 3). 113	
Take in Figure 3 114	
  115	
Whilst official food safety governance in China has improved significantly in past 116	
decades, problems still remain (Liu, 2010; Lam, Remais, Fung, Xu & Sun, 2013; Holtkamp, 117	
Liu & McGuire, 2014; Unnevehr & Hoffmann, 2015). Suggested reasons for this include: 118	
unclear and overlapped responsibilities for different authorities (Liu, 2010; Holtkamp, Liu & 119	
McGuire, 2014; Verbruggen & Havinga, 2017); poor coordination and communication 120	
between departments and regions (Liu, 2010; Jia & Jukes, 2013), lax enforcement (Pei et al. 121	
2011; Yang, 2013), low penalties (Liang, 2011), inferior legal requirements (Jia & Jukes, 122	
2013; Yang, 2013); numerous small-scale producers (Peng, Li, Xia, Qi & Li, 2015; 123	
Verbruggen & Havinga, 2017), and fragmented consumer groups (Zhou, 2017). In this nexus, 124	
third-party governance began to develop. 125	
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2.2 Third-party governance 126	
 Third-party governance involves multiple stakeholders including the media, private 127	
standards owners and third-party certification, consumer associations, non-governmental 128	
organisations (NGOs) and industry associations (Zhang, Qiao, Wang, Pu, Yu & Zheng, 2015). 129	
Media plays an important role in governance by exposing incidents and subsequently 130	
influencing the behaviour and attitude of government, food producers and consumers (Cope et 131	
al. 2010; Qiang, Wen, Jing & Yue, 2011; Liu, Pieniak & Verbeke, 2013; Mol, 2014; Peng, Li, 132	
Xia, Qi & Li, 2015). By establishing governance standards, consumer associations contribute 133	
considerably to food safety governance (Zhang, Qiao, Wang, Pu, Yu & Zheng, 2015). 134	
Moreover, there are several private third-party certification (TPC) standards, such as 135	
GlobalGAP (GAP = Good Agricultural Practice) and the British Retail Consortium (BRC) 136	
standard amongst others. TPC schemes address the independent certification of the 137	
management of elements of the food supply chain (Manning & Soon, 2014) and can interface 138	
in a modular approach to provide whole assurance for a given supply chain (Manning, 2018). 139	
Some question the trustworthiness of TPC (Albersmeier, Schulze, Jahn & Spiller, 2009) 140	
especially as part of a wider private-public governance structure (Turku, Lepistö & Lundén, 141	
2018). However, the use of TPC in China is restricted (Chen, Wang & Song 2015; 142	
Kottenstede, 2017) and insufficient development of NGOs and industry associations mean 143	
their impact is negligible (Zhang, Qiao, Wang, Pu, Yu & Zheng, 2015).  Thus media reporting 144	
has a role to play, despite food safety governance still predominantly being driven by 145	
government (Chen, Wang & Song, 2015).  146	
2.3 Transparency of governance 147	
Transparency through information disclosure reduces information asymmetry between 148	
consumers and powerful organisations, such as government and food enterprises, whereby 149	
one party has more information or knowledge than another (Mol, 2014; Pettinger, 2017). In 150	
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China, food safety communication with consumers is undertaken through five official 151	
channels. These channels are: official information releases (most frequently used), whistle-152	
blowing hotlines (e.g.12315), free consultations from food safety experts working jointly with 153	
government, educational events (e.g. ‘Food safety on campus’ activities), and social media 154	
reports by official or semi-official accounts provided by the CFDA, MOH, MOA, and AQSIQ 155	
(Zhou, 2017). According to Food Safety Laws (FSL) (State Council of China, 2015), relevant 156	
departments disseminate information when certain food products are deemed unsafe, and 157	
failure to disclose will be punished through warning, demerit record, demotion or even 158	
dismissal based on the seriousness of circumstances. However, the current official 159	
information disclosure system is inhibited by a number of factors. Firstly, the large number of 160	
food producers in China means it is difficult for regulatory departments to collect complete 161	
food safety information, and consequently, they fail to make information immediately 162	
available to consumers on regular basis (Jia & Jukes, 2013; Peng, Li, Xia, Qi & Li, 2015; 163	
Zhou, 2017). Secondly, to maintain social stability and national image, release of information 164	
on food incidents can be delayed in a three-step approach consisting of supressing, framing 165	
and repressing (Lam, Remais, Fung, Xu & Sun, 2013; Yang, 2013; Zhou, 2017). For instance, 166	
several months before the exposure of melamine scandal in 2008, while some state agencies 167	
received complaints from consumers, little information was released immediately, and 168	
subsequently, only positive information was mainly published (Yang, 2013). Thirdly, 169	
underreporting is common, especially for food-borne diseases with chronic and minor 170	
symptoms (Soon, Singh & Baines, 2011; Lam, Remais, Fung, Xu & Sun, 2013).  171	
While government transparency may be limited in this regard, it does not mean that 172	
information disclosure systems functions poorly. Official departments are crucial in clarifying 173	
potentially false rumours, otherwise they may generate unnecessary scares and consequently 174	
social instability (Jia & Jukes, 2013; Zhou, 2017). Fake news reports that have required 175	
clarification include fishermen using contraceptives to expedite growth of swamp eel (a 176	
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species of fish in China), and McDonald’s using genetically modified six-wing chickens for 177	
their products (CFDA, 2017). More importantly, studies found that most consumers regard 178	
the government as the most reliable source of information, even though they believed official 179	
information was underreported (Li et al. 2012; Liu, Pieniak & Verbeke, 2013; Zhang, Xu, 180	
Oosterveer & Mol, 2016). 181	
There has been a sharp rise in food safety scandals reported by media (Mol, 2014; Liu & 182	
Ma, 2016). In addition, according to WHO (2017), over 60% of outbreak reports arise from 183	
unofficial sources, especially online media, clenbuterol-contaminated pork and white sprite 184	
containing plasticizers were firstly revealed online (Zhang, Qiao, Wang, Pu, Yu & Zheng, 185	
2015). Some Chinese consumers report that the media is their main source for receiving food 186	
safety related information (McCluskey & Swinnen, 2011; Li et al. 2012; Jin & Han, 2014).   187	
However when considering transparency, journalists may choose to expose or omit certain 188	
reports when disclosing (Veil & Yang, 2012). For example, at the beginning of the melamine 189	
milk scandal, the company Sanlu mainly responsible for the incident, reached a deal with 190	
Baidu, the largest search engine in China, to delete the relevant negative online news (Zhang, 191	
Qiao, Wang, Pu, Yu & Zheng, 2015; Huang, Wu & Cheng, 2016). Secondly, due to the lack 192	
of employees with scientific background, media tends to acquire information from unreliable 193	
sources, exaggerate incidents and disseminate false information (Jia & Jukes, 2013; Zhang, 194	
Qiao, Wang, Pu, Yu & Zheng, 2015; Huang, Wu & Cheng, 2016). Moreover, since the media, 195	
by and large, is influenced by the government (Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011; Gehlbach & 196	
Sonin, 2014; Yuan, 2016), disclosure may be limited and bias could occur.  While these 197	
critiques in the literature have some value, since the reformation of the media in the 1980s, 198	
control has lessened considerably (Holtkamp, Liu & McGuire, 2014; Babu, Aggarwal & 199	
Chen, 2017). After the launch of Food Safety Laws by the State Council of China in 2009, 200	
food safety information is released without government intervention (Liu, Liu & Gao, 2015). 201	
Additionally, the Chinese government tends to encourage the media to expose food safety 202	
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scandals (Lu & Wu, 2014; Zhang, Qiao, Wang, Pu, Yu & Zheng, 2015), because of their low 203	
political sensitivity (Liu & Ma, 2016).  204	
Several studies use media reports in China as their data sources for research. Some looked 205	
at patterns of news media coverage only (Liu & Ma, 2016; Zhang & Xue, 2016).  Others have 206	
compared the official reports against public news media reports (Holtkamp, Liu & McGuire, 207	
2014; Liu, Liu, Zhang & Gao, 2015; Chen, Huang, Nong & Kwan, 2016). Exploring patterns 208	
of news media coverage of food safety incidents in China, Zhang and Xue (2016) manually 209	
collected 2534 media reports (1553 incidents) for the period of 2004-2014 from nearly 40 210	
news media, covering 32 provinces. They found that all food safety incidents were associated 211	
with economically motivated fraud or adulteration, which are very much linked to the level of 212	
industrialisation and urbanisation, i.e. that complex supply chains are becoming increasingly 213	
opaque. Economically developed provinces such as Guangdong, Beijing, Shandong, Zhejiang 214	
had the highest number of exposures. This finding concur with Liu and Ma (2016), who found 215	
the capital city of Guangdong, Beijing, Shandong and Zhejiang provinces had the highest 216	
number of reports of food scandals by analysing the reports collected by a team of 34 217	
volunteers (Wu, 2011). Zhang and Xue (2016) also found that intentional distribution of 218	
contaminated products and artificial enhancement were the top fraud types reported. However 219	
in neither of these studies did the methodology seek to distinguish reports by source i.e. 220	
government sources and information sourced from public news reports.  This research gap is 221	
considered in this paper to be of interest as the disclosure of information between different 222	
sources may be nuanced and driven by the particular motivations of the government and also 223	
the media which may, or may not be similar. 224	
Studies examining differences between government reports and media reports observe 225	
differences in terms of the location or cause of the reported incident (Chen, Huang, Nong & 226	
Kwan, 2016), quantity of reporting (Holtkamp, Liu & McGuire, 2014; Liu, Liu, Zhang & 227	
Gao, 2015), and original sources of reports (Liu, Liu, Zhang & Gao, 2015). Comparing 228	
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official and news media reports between 2006 and 2012 on food poisoning incidents (based 229	
on a database collected through web-crawler, n=6701), Chen, Huang, Nong and Kwan (2016) 230	
found that official news reported higher home and school/company cafeterias food poisoning 231	
occurrences with microorganism (40%) and animal, plant and fungi toxin (31%) being the top 232	
causes, whilst news media report more cases occurred at cafeteria and restaurants, with top 233	
causes being man-made chemical hazards (22%)  or not clearly identified (37%). The other 234	
two studies both rely on Wu’s (2011) database. Holtkamp, Liu and McGuire (2014) analyse 235	
government and media reports between 2004 and 2011 across the whole country (n=2107). 236	
They find that the number of food safety incidents reported by the media tended to be lower 237	
than by official departments. This nationwide trend concurs with Liu, Liu, Zhang and Gao 238	
(2015) who use the same database with a focus on Beijing only (n = 295). They differentiate 239	
between incidents revealed by government and by news media and find that government 240	
reports (n = 150) are slighty more than those disclosed by news media only. They also find 241	
that consumers provide the information for 40% of the incidents reported, suggesting that the 242	
media could be a “chosen” information channel for consumers to highlight their complaints.  243	
Findings from the above mentioned studies are based on incidents across all food categories 244	
and such data provides good insight into the patterns and trends of food scandals in China. 245	
However, it is difficult to assess the role public news media plays compared with official 246	
government reporting. Through comparing government and media reports on food safety 247	
incidents of a single category of products (dairy related), this study aims to examine the role 248	
of news media in food safety governance in China by considering four research questions: 249	
Question 1: What were the quantity and nature of incidents exposed by the 250	
government and by media and how did this change over time? 251	
Question 2: What were the origin of information, geographic location and the cause 252	
of the incidents reported by the government and by media? 253	
Question 3: What was the reporting timescale for incidents and did this vary 254	
according to communication channel? 255	
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Question 4: How did the information compare and contrast between government 256	
reports and media reports? 257	
 258	
Dairy products were chosen because of the global role China plays in dairy production and 259	
due to the array of incidents that have occurred in the supply chain (see Wu et al. 2018). The 260	
research approach is now discussed. 261	
3. Material and methods 262	
 The research took an inductive, longitudinal approach through directly comparing real 263	
life reporting of food safety incidents by government and news media over a 14-year period 264	
(2004-217). Holtkamp, Liy and McGuire (2014 p.459) suggest that “media data can be a valid 265	
source for scholars interested in studying food safety or other controversial topics in China” 266	
and this approach is used by Liu, Liu, Zhang and Gao (2015) in their research. Two online 267	
databases in relation to online media reports on food safety incidents are available in China. 268	
They are “Zhichuchuangwai (ZCCW)” (Wu, 2011) and Food Safety Information Database for 269	
Greater China (FSIDfGC) (Chen, Huang, Nong & Kwan, 2016). A comparison of the two 270	
databases are presented in Table 1.  271	
Take in Table 1 272	
The data used in this study is from ZCCW.  The database is considered as more appropriate 273	
for its representativeness of reporting online (Wu, 2011; Liu, Liu, Zhang & Gao, 2015; Liu & 274	
Ma, 2016), higher relevance to food safety incidents and longer period it covered. FSIDfGC is 275	
based on web-crawling using keywords. This means that the database contains reports not 276	
relevant to food safety incidents. For example, a search of “melamine” could include reports 277	
about policy, trend, scientific research reports, trade association reports and regulations whilst 278	
the ZCCW database is manually filtered for food safety incidents (Wu, 2011; Liu, Liu, Zhang 279	
& Gao, 2015). We also test-searched on FSIDfGC some incidents that are included in ZCCW 280	
and failed to find them in FSIDfGC. This could be because some incidents were deleted from 281	
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online search engines as reported by Zhang, Qiao, Wang, Pu, Yu and Zheng, (2015), hence 282	
could not have been included in FSIDfGC which was only completed in 2015, whilst the 283	
initial ZCCW database was completed in 2011 and then updated periodically (Wu, 2011; Liu 284	
& Ma, 2016).  285	
      ZCCW has developed two lists of key words to facilitate online search of the database. 286	
One list includes 1610 food names identified by the editors and the other list includes 2159 287	
keywords indicating causes of food safety incidents (http://www.zccw.info/query). Those 288	
keywords were also adopted by Chen Huang, Nong and Kwan (2016) for FSIDfGC. In this 289	
study, out of the listed 2159 search terms, fifty-one were identified to be relevant to dairy 290	
products and dairy incidents (Figure 4). Full translation is provided in the Appendix. This 291	
generated 248 reports in the timeframe between 2004 and 2017. Fifteen reports were excluded 292	
because they were dairy product safety alerts or advice. Therefore, the total number of dairy 293	
safety incident related reports was 233. Although the database is supposed to include 294	
“uniquely identified” food safety incidents (Liu & Ma, 2016, p. 105), some multiple reports 295	
were found of the same incidents. Further cleaning of the data resulted in the identification of 296	
165 unique incidents.  297	
Take in Figure 4 298	
The reports were then subjected to thematic content analysis using NVivo 11 in line with the 299	
previously published methodology (see Liu, Liu, Zhang & Gao, 2015). Although the reports 300	
were in Chinese, the coding was manual and in English. A structured coding system was 301	
initially generated from the literature and then iteratively developed by the first two authors 302	
(see Table 2). The coding was conducted by the first author and checked by the second 303	
author.  The second author only recoded areas of disagreement. Therefore standard Kappa 304	
coefficient was not obtained.  305	
Take in Table 2 306	
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The results are now presented and analysed. 307	
4. Results and analysis 308	
In the dairy incidents dataset (n = 233), government reports were substantially fewer than 309	
media reports where media reports accounted 76.4% of the dataset (n = 178) with 24 incidents 310	
reported by both media and government and 27 incidents by government only.   311	
Question 1: What were the quantity and nature of incidents exposed by the government 312	
and by media and how did this change over time? 313	
 314	
The reports are analysed by source/channel (Table 3) and by product type (Table 4). 315	
Take in Tables 3 and 4 316	
The total number of incidents on milk powder (n = 72) and fresh milk (n = 57) is higher than 317	
other types. Specifically, incidents on milk powder (45.8%) are most likely to be reported by 318	
both government and media. In addition, yogurt (16.7%) and milk beverage (12.5%) incidents 319	
are reported by both the government and media. The most frequent product incident reported 320	
by government is related to milk powder (48.1%) and apart from milk powder (42.1%), 321	
“media only” reported incidents were associated with fresh milk (43.9%). For fresh milk 322	
related incidents, almost 90% were covered by the media and the media revealed an additional 323	
33 more incidents with milk powder than with the government reporting. 324	
Question 2: What were the origin of information, geographic location and the cause of 325	
the incidents reported by the government and by media? 326	
4.1 Causes of incidents 327	
The causes of incidents are divided into ten categories: non-food raw materials found in dairy 328	
products e.g. melamine in milk powder; counterfeit products; microbial contamination; 329	
foreign bodies such as hair; additives which did not comply with food safety standards 330	
including preservatives; insects contamination such as maggots; out of date/expired products; 331	
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dairy products that were reprocessed from inferior materials; nutritional non-compliance e.g. 332	
insufficient protein content; with other causes accounting for only a very small percentage of 333	
reports (Table 5). 334	
Take in Table 5 335	
The causes of incidents include both food safety (microbial or foreign body contamination), 336	
food fraud issues such as counterfeit product and misrepresentation that may, or may not, 337	
have health implications. Interestingly foreign body contamination, and insect contamination 338	
are only reported in the media. Sixty-nine percent of the incidents are reported in the “media 339	
only”, compared with government only (16,4%) and both media and government (14.5%). 340	
This highlights the role of the media in information disclosure to the Chinese population.  341	
5.2 Geographic location (province) 342	
 Table 6 compares the provinces where the incidents occurred. Provinces with six or 343	
more reports published on food safety incidents are listed separately. Provinces with fewer 344	
than six incidents are labelled as “other provinces”. When the same incidents occur in several 345	
provinces, they are labelled as “multiple provinces” incidents. Multiple provinces reported the 346	
highest incidence (n=41 [65%]) followed by those in Guangdong (12.7%). Both government 347	
and media tended to report incidents occurring in multiple provinces, Guangdong and 348	
Shanghai. The number of the reports in some provinces (Zhejiang, Beijing, Guangxi, Hebei, 349	
Shandong, Henan and Jiangsu) is only one or zero. Government only reports tend to expose 350	
incidents in multiple provinces (29.6%), Guangdong (18.5%), and Beijing (14.8%). In terms 351	
of incidents exposed by “media only”, they are more likely to occur in multiple provinces 352	
(22.8%).  353	
Take in Table 6 354	
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Additionally, the proportion of incidents in Guangdong, Zhejiang, Shanghai and Beijing is 355	
also high, with each accounting for approximately 10%. Moreover, the number of media 356	
reports in all other provinces was fewer than six in each case. However within this analysis it 357	
should be noted that although the number of media reports in Guangxi was ten, all these 358	
reports were about one incident namely farmers adding chlorine dioxide into fresh milk to 359	
extend shelf-life. By contrast, some types of incidents were generally reported only once. 360	
Therefore it is important not to translate the frequency of reports directly as a means to 361	
identify the frequency of actual incidents. 362	
5.3 Physical location that incidents occurred 363	
The physical locations where the reported dairy related incidents occurred are divided into six 364	
categories: home; factories; farms; retailers/supermarkets; stores and local street shops; 365	
schools; and not specified, i.e. where the location is not mentioned in the incident reports. The 366	
incidents without specified physical location was the largest group (58.1%), followed by those 367	
occurring at home (29.7%). Incidents occurring at schools (1.8%) are the least likely to be 368	
reported by all channels (Table 7). The majority of government reports did not mention 369	
location (96.3%), compared to only 4.2% where location was not identified by “media only” 370	
reports. This is an interesting difference between the two channels. 371	
Take in Table 7 372	
While “media only” reports exposed forty-six incidents at home, only one incident is reported 373	
by government only reports. All incidents reported as occurring in factories, farms, retailers 374	
and schools are exposed by the “media only” although proportionately each of these 375	
categories is below 7% of the total. In the media reports incidents occurring in factories and 376	
without specified locations tend to be reported several times with two factory located 377	
incidents being identified in 14 reports. One example identified shows producers extracting 378	
proteins from disposed of leather shoes or sofas and adding them to milk powder in order for 379	
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defective products to pass analytical tests for protein content. The other incident highlights a 380	
dairy company mixing in-date and expired milk powder, then re-selling those products to 381	
consumers. 382	
 Other areas included in the reporting information are: identification of government 383	
response, risk communication about the incident, e.g. the negative effects of ingesting 384	
melamine or how to recognise counterfeit products; information linking with previous 385	
incidents; introducing the corrective action by dairy companies which included both positive 386	
and negative comment; comments on the government, e.g. complaints on weak response by 387	
local government; market research to gain opinions from consumers or investigate whether 388	
unsafe products were still sold by retailers (Table 8).  389	
Take in Table 8 390	
Media reports are more likely to include educational content about the incidents (33.1%). 391	
Furthermore, media reports provide information about linkages with previous incidents 392	
(20.2%), government reaction (19.7%), dairy company reaction (16.3%), comments on the 393	
government (12.9%), suggestions (8.4%) and market research (8.4%). 394	
Question 3: What was the reporting timescale for incidents and did this vary according 395	
to communication channel?	396	
Of the 24 incidents exposed by both government and media, almost 90% (n = 21) are exposed 397	
first by the government, and only three are reported earlier by the media. Table 9 shows the 398	
feature of incidents exposed by both government and media.  399	
Take in Table 9 400	
In terms of product types, the incidents reported earlier by government are more likely to be 401	
milk powder. However, it should be noted that due to the small number of incidents discussed 402	
here, generalisations are not possible. Differences in reporting channel between geographic 403	
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location and causes are not substantial, especially as over 90% of the earlier incidents 404	
revealed by government did not specify geographic location and all incidents reported earlier 405	
by the media occurred in multiple areas. Figure 5 shows that the total number of incidents 406	
exposed was the highest in 2005 and 2012. In 2005, 37 incidents were reported 51 times. In 407	
2012, 29 incidents were reported 63 times. As shown in Figure 4, milk power and fresh milk 408	
were affected most. Top causes reported in 2005 were substandard nutrition and counterfeit 409	
products whilst in 2012 product adulteration and microbial contamination were reported most.  410	
Strikingly, very few or no incidents were reported in 2004, 2010, and between 2014 and 2017.  411	
The government exposed the highest number of incidents in 2005, with eight incidents being 412	
exposed, however, the number for other years is fewer than five (Figure 6). The incidents 413	
uncovered by media only in 2005, 2011, 2012 and 2013 are more than other years, being all 414	
above 15. Additionally, there is also a noticeable increase in 2009 before a sharp decrease in 415	
2010. 416	
Take in Figures 4, 5 and 6 417	
Comparatively in most the years, “media only” highlight more incidents than the government 418	
alone. This is particularly true for 2005 and 2012. In 2005, while “media only” reported 23 419	
incidents, government alone only exposed eight. In 2012, “media only” revealed 21 incidents, 420	
nevertheless, only two were exposed government alone.  421	
Question 4: How did the information compare and contrast between government 422	
reports and media reports? 423	
  From 2004 to 2017, only twenty-four of the safety incidents (n = 165) were reported 424	
by both government and media. This shows the degree of differentiation between the two 425	
reporting systems with the government alone revealing twenty-seven incidents.  Without the 426	
media reporting, consumers would be unaware of the additional incidents. This finding here is 427	
in contrast with Holtkamp, Liu and McGuire (2014) and Liu, Liu and Gao (2015) who found 428	
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that the government tended to report more incidents than the media. One possible explanation 429	
for this difference is that the previous research covers all food categories, while this study 430	
only focuses on dairy products. Additionally, considering that 2009 is a milestone in China 431	
food safety regulations, a comparison of reports published between 2004-2009 and those 432	
between 2010-2017 was conducted. As presented in Figures 7 and 8, media reports were 433	
significantly higher during 2010-2017.  434	
6. Discussion 435	
 China has witnessed a sharp increase in reported food safety incidents, which has not 436	
only raised concerns among Chinese consumers, but also damaged the international reputation 437	
of Chinese food industry (Jia & Jukes, 2013; Peng, Li, Xia, Qi & Li, 2015; Liu & Ma, 2016). 438	
To improve this situation, official food safety systems has been reformed, and third-party 439	
stakeholders, especially news media, have played an increasingly important role in the 440	
governance of food safety (Jia & Jukes, 2013; Zhang, Qiao, Wang, Pu, Yu & Zheng, 2015). 441	
To protect public health, communicating food safety risk in a timely way is essential (Wright, 442	
2016). Therefore, channels that provide early warning of incidents can play a more important 443	
role in food safety governance. Food incidents impact on human health and erode consumer 444	
trust (Elliott Review, 2014). Information disclosure and transparency increase consumer trust 445	
(Mol, 2014). Consumers perceptions of food safety risk is dependent on the information they 446	
receive, its source and then how they cognitively frame the message to inform trust  (Liu, 447	
Pieniak & Verbeke, 2014) who found that after the television the internet was the second most 448	
frequent channel used by consumers for information about food safety. This study found food 449	
producers to be the least trusted, a neutral level of trust in government information and 450	
greatest levels of trust in consumer associations, research institutes, relatives and friends. 451	
 The role of the media as an information source and more widely as an actor in food 452	
safety governance is considered here and increasing public attention towards the safety of 453	
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dairy products in China may have contributed to the greater reporting of incidents by 454	
consumers direct to the media.  Government reported incidents are based on official 455	
inspections, which indicates that Chinese government tends to only trust its own inspections 456	
as has been suggested by some want to ensure that all reports are verified before release (Jia 457	
& Jukes, 2013; Zhou, 2017). In contrast, the media relies heavily on collecting information 458	
from a wide range of sources, but the reliability of the information provided by such sources 459	
is arguably difficult to validate and thus the interpretation of such data should be undertaken 460	
with caution.  The fact that no media reports are identified as being sourced from official 461	
inspections suggests that the government tends not to share their information with the media 462	
concurring with the study of Liu, Liu and Gao (2015). Although the number of incidents 463	
sourced from trade associations and dairy companies was extremely low, these incidents are 464	
more likely to be reported multiple times perhaps because the media felt they had greater 465	
reliability.  466	
 Milk powder is the most reported incident, although the influence of purposive 467	
regulatory sampling should be considered (see Kowalska, Manning & Soon, 2018).  In the 468	
“media only” incidents there is a strong focus on fresh milk, probably as a result of the shorter 469	
shelf-life as out of date/expired products were the mostly commonly reported problem. A 470	
focus in this research on incident types adds to the current literature, since no previous study 471	
has compared the type of reported incident with a specific focus to the dairy products. Apart 472	
from microbial contamination, which is heavily reported by the government, the media also 473	
exposes substandard nutrition and counterfeit products frequently as did Chen, Huang, Nong 474	
and Kwan (2016). However in contrast the results from this study did not highlight animal, 475	
plant or fungi toxin and food additives as frequently reported issues probably ue to the 476	
product type. For example, there is no regulation on pesticides and veterinary drug residues 477	
for dairy products in China, since the government only controls this issue through monitoring 478	
animal feeds (NHCPRC, 2013). Interestingly “media only” reported incidents are related to 479	
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expired products, foreign body and insect contamination perhaps explained by the heavy 480	
reliance of media on consumers as the information source. It should be noted that government 481	
reports did not focus on foreign body or insect contamination.   482	
 This study is novel in examining the provinces where dairy incidents occur and 483	
interestingly most incidents reported by government do not identify the physical location 484	
where the incident occurs, but perhaps that is because the product has already been removed 485	
from sale and is not seen to pose a risk thus the location is not identified. In media reports, the 486	
home was the most frequently reported contradicting McCarthy, Brennan, De Boer and Ritson 487	
(2008) and Chen, Huang, Nong and Kwan (2016) who state that the media tended to report 488	
incidents that happen in public areas. The majority of government reports mention the 489	
reaction of the government, which is not surprising, as the government seeks to show its 490	
responsible behaviour to the public. Most media reports include educational information 491	
about the incidents, link the incidents with previous incidents and introduce the reactions of 492	
the government and dairy companies. Specially, areas of information comprising previous 493	
incidents, comments on government activity, and market research are only included in media 494	
reports. With more variety and a larger amount of information included in media reports, it is 495	
possible for consumers to gain more understanding of an incident. These results support the 496	
work of McCarthy, Brennan, De Boer and Ritson (2008) and Shan et al. (2014), and extent 497	
their findings to identify additional information provided to the public. The timing of reports 498	
identified in this study agrees with Shan et al. (2014) that the government exposes incidents 499	
earlier than the media.   500	
 Through analysing the government and media reports on dairy related food safety 501	
incidents reported between 2004 and 2017, differences were found between government 502	
reporting and media reporting. This research shows that the media plays a complementary 503	
role in food safety governance in China. Firstly, the media exposed more incidents than the 504	
government, with 114 reported only by media, 27 only by government and 24 by both 505	
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government and media. Owing to the small number of incidents exposed by both government 506	
and media in this study, no conclusions can be drawn on dual reporting. However, since this 507	
comparison can contribute to a better understanding of the role of media in food safety 508	
governance further empirical work should be undertaken in this area.   509	
7. Conclusion 510	
 Using dairy products as the food item of interest, the aim of the research was to 511	
explore the role of the media in food safety governance in China. Thematic content analysis 512	
was used to evaluate government and news media reports on dairy related food safety 513	
incidents in China between 2004 and 2017.  However it should be noted that some original 514	
websites hyperlinked on ZCCW cannot be accessed now, making it impossible to evaluate the 515	
quality and validity of all the data, which is a limitation on this study. The small dataset 516	
examined here means that only preliminary findings can be presented and further studies with 517	
a larger dataset need to be undertaken to confirm the results can be further generalised. The 518	
government performed better on exposing incidents earlier within the 14-year period but the 519	
news media played a complementary role in food safety governance exposing a wider 520	
coverage of incidents especially those identified in the home.  This is particularly so after 521	
2009 when adulteration and contamination incidents were reported more widely by media. 522	
This study extends the current literature on the role of the news media in food safety 523	
governance in China by focusing on a single food sector (dairy), but on a national scale, and 524	
also considering the physical location where the incident has occurred.  The contribution this 525	
paper makes to existing literature is to address the role of media reporting of food incidents in 526	
wider food safety governance. As supply chains become more global and complex, effective 527	
risk communication is essential. It is important that emerging models of risk communication 528	
are considered and critiqued in order to ensure that consumers can readily access information 529	
about the food they consume. Although this research has focused on dairy sector specifically 530	
the work has provided a some understanding that could be extended to other food categories. 531	
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News media alone was considered in this research. However, social media has played an 532	
increasingly important role in food safety governance, hence, it would be helpful for further 533	
research to investigate role of social media in food safety governance. Therefore, further 534	
studies are suggested to investigate a wider range of media exposure to reflect the role of 535	
media in food safety governance in China more comprehensively.   536	
   537	
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Abbreviations  
AQSIQ Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine 
BRC British Retail Consortium 
CFDA China Food and Drug Administration 
FSL Food Safety Laws 
GAP. Good Agricultural Practices  
MOA Ministry of Agriculture 
MOH Ministry of Health  
NFSC National Food Safety Commission  
NGOs Non-Governmental Organisations 
NHCPRC National Health Commission of the People’s republic of China 





Table 1. Comparison of databases of reports on food incidents in China 721	
 Zhichuchuangwai (ZCCW)  Food Safety Information Database for 
Greater China (FSIDfGC)  
Web address http://www.zccw.info http://kwanlab.bio.cuhk.edu.hk/FS/ 
Year database was launched 2011 2015 
Geographical area covered Mainland China Greater China (China, Hong Kong, 
Macau and Taiwan) 
Methods of data collection Manual Web-crawling 
Relevance to food safety 
incidents 
Filtered to include only reports 
on food safety incidents) 
May include information about food 
safety incidents  as well as policy, 
trend, scientific research reports, 
trade association reports and 
regulations) 
Number of reports on food 
safety incidents included 
2107 (between 2004 and 2011) 





Table 2. Levels of coding and sources of codes 724	





Liu, Liu, Zhang & Gao, (2015) 
Media instigated by consumers 
Media instigated by government 
Media instigated by journalists 
Media instigated by trade associations 








Cheese and cream 
Other dairy products 
Causes 
Microbial contamination 
Liu, Liu, Zhang & Gao, (2015) 
Substandard nutrition 
Non-food raw material contamination 




Counterfeit products (fake) 
Authors’ own Out of date/expired products 
Insect contamination 
Provinces 
There are 34 provinces in China. No previous study has compared the provinces of incidents. 
Hence, this research is the first to compare the nature of incidents by provinces. 
Location 
Home 
McCarthy, Brennan, De Boer & Ritson 
(2008) / Chen, Huang, Nong & Kwan, 
(2016) 






Other areas of 
information 
included 
Reaction of the government 
Authors’ own 
(This research is the first to compare other 
areas of information included.) 
Knowledge about the incidents 
Linking with previous incidents 
Reaction of dairy companies 
Comments on the government 






Table 3. The original sources of information on dairy related food safety incidents vs 727	














Count 22 27 0 49 (55) 
% within the source 44.9% 56.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 




Count 0 0 50 50 (59) 
% within the source 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 




Count 2 0 25 27 (39) 
% within the source 7.4% 0.0% 92.6% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 




Count 0 0 23 23 (33) 
% within the source 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 





Count 0 0 7 7 (21) 
% within the source 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 




Count 0 0 3 3 (17) 
% within the source 0.0% 0.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 
0.0% 0.0% 2.6% 1.8% 
Other sources Count 0 0 6 6 (9) 
% within the source 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 
0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 3.6% 
Total Count 24 27 114 165 (233) 
% within the source 14.5% 16.4% 69.1% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 



















Count 11 14 47 72 (99) 
% within the type 15.3% 18.1% 66.7% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 
45.8% 51.9% 41.2% 43.6% 
Fresh milk Count 2 5 50 57 (93) 
% within the type 3.5% 8.8% 87.7% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 
8.3% 18.5% 43.9% 34.5% 
Milk 
beverage  
Count 3 3 6 12 (15) 
% within the type 25.0% 25.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 
12.5% 11.1% 5.3% 7.3% 
Yogurt  Count 4 3 5 12 (14) 
% within the type 33.3% 25.0% 41.7% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 
16.7% 11.1% 4.4% 7.3% 
Cheese and 
cream 
Count 0 1 2 3 (3) 
% within the type 0.0% 33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 
0.0% 3.7% 1.8% 1.8% 
Other dairy 
products 
Count 4 1 4 9 (9) 
% within the type 44.4% 11.1% 44.4% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 
16.7% 3.7% 3.5% 5.5% 
Total Count 24 27 114 165 (233) 
% within the type 14.5% 16.4% 69.1% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 





Table 5. The causes of dairy related food safety incidents vs. reporting channels 735	















Count 3 10 18 31 (39) 
% within the cause 9.7% 32.3% 58.1% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 





Count 4 3 18 25 (38) 
% within the cause 16.0% 12.0% 72.0% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 





Count 4 1 18 23 (33) 
% within the cause 17.4% 4.3% 78.3% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 





Count 5 5 10 20 (47) 
% within the cause 25.0% 25.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 
20.8% 18.5% 8.8% 12.1% 




Count 2 0 10 12 (13) 
% within the cause 16.7% 0.0% 83.3% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 





Count 0 0 10 10 (11) 
% within the cause 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 





Count 0 0 10 10 (11) 
% within the cause 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 




Count 2 3 4 9 (10) 
% within the cause 22.2% 33.3% 44.4% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 
8.3% 11.1% 3.5% 5.5% 





% within the cause 25.0% 25.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 




Count 3 4 14 21 (23) 
% within the cause 14.3% 19.0% 66.7% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 




Count 24 27 114 165 (233) 
% within the cause 14.5% 16.4% 69.1% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 736	
Note: in this work product adulteration is considered to be the intentional addition or substitution of a material 737	
within a food product for the perpetrators to derive economic benefit from doing so. Counterfeit products are 738	
considered to be those products that are made to look like or be an exact replica or imitation of another product 739	




Table 6. The provinces of dairy related food safety incidents vs. reporting channels 743	











Count 7 8 26 41 (63) 
% within the area 17.1% 19.5% 63.4% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 
29.2% 29.6% 22.8% 24.8% 
Guangdong Count 3 5 13 21 (27) 
% within the area 14.3% 23.8% 61.9% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 
12.5% 18.5% 11.4% 12.7% 
Shanghai Count 3 2 11 16 (21) 
% within the area 18.8% 12.5% 68.8% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 
12.5% 7.4% 9.6% 9.7% 
Beijing Count 0 4 12 16 (20) 
% within the area 0.0% 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 
0.0% 14.8% 10.5% 9.7% 
Zhejiang Count 1 0 10 11 (22) 
% within the area 9.1% 0.0% 90.9% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 
4.2% 0.0% 8.8% 6.7% 
Shandong Count 1 0 6 7 (7) 
% within the area 14.3% 0.0% 85.7% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 
4.2% 0.0% 5.3% 4.2% 
Hebei Count 1 1 3 5 (9) 
% within the area 20.0% 20.0% 60.0% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 
4.2% 3.7% 2.6% 3.0% 
Jiangsu Count 1 0 4 5 (6) 
% within the area 20.0% 0.0% 80.0% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 
4.2% 0.0% 3.5% 3.0% 
Hunan Count 1 0 3 4 (6) 
	 36	
% within the area 25.0% 0.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 
4.2% 0.0% 2.6% 2.4% 
Guangxi 
 
Count 0 0 1 1 (10) 
% within the area 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 
0.0% 0.0% 0.9% 0.6% 
Other 
provinces 
Count 6 7 25 38 (42) 
% within the area 15.8% 18.4% 65.8% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 
25.0% 25.9% 21.9% 23.0% 
Total Count 24 27 114 165 (233) 
% within the area 14.5% 16.4% 69.1% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 





Table 7. The location of dairy related food safety incidents vs types of channels 747	









Not specified Count 22 26 48 96 (136) 
% within the location 22.9% 27.1% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 
91.7% 96.3% 42.1% 58.2% 
Home Count 2 1 46 49 (53) 
% within the location 4.1% 2.0% 93.9% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 
8.3% 3.7% 40.4% 29.7% 
Factories Count 0 0 7 7 (15) 
% within the location 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 
0.0% 0.0% 6.1% 4.2% 
Farms Count 0 0 2 2 (14) 
% within the location 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 
0.0% 0.0% 1.8% 1.2% 
Retailers Count 0 0 8 8 (11) 
% within the location 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 
0.0% 0.0% 7.0% 4.8% 
Schools Count 0 0 3 3 (4) 
% within the location 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 
0.0% 0.0% 2.6% 1.8% 
Total Count 24 27 114 165 (233) 
% within the location 14.5% 16.4% 69.1% 100.0% 
% within incidents published 
by the channel 







Table 8. Other areas included in reporting of dairy related food safety incidents. 753	
Other areas included 
Government reports Media reports 
Number Proportion Number Proportion 
Reaction of the government 45 81.8% 35 19.7% 
Knowledge about the incidents 8 14.5% 59 33.1% 
Linking with previous incidents 0 0.0% 36 20.2% 
Reaction of dairy companies 2 3.6% 29 16.3% 
Comments on the government 0 0.0% 23 12.9% 
Suggestions for consumers 3 5.5% 15 8.4% 
Market research 0 0.0% 15 8.4% 




Table 9. The features of the dairy related incidents reported by both government and 756	
media 757	







Milk powder 10 1 11 
Fresh milk 2 1 3 
Milk beverage 2 1 3 
Yogurt 3 0 3 
Cheese and cream 0 0 0 
Other dairy products 4 0 4 











Non-food raw material 3 2 5 
Microbial contamination 3 0 3 
Substandard nutrition 4 0 4 
Counterfeit products 3 1 4 
Out of date/expired products 2 0 2 
Foreign bodies 0 0 0 
Insect contamination 0 0 0 
Food additives 2 0 2 
Reprocessed products 1 0 1 
Others  3 0 3 












Multiple provinces 4 3 7 
Guangdong 3 0 3 
Zhejiang 1 0 1 
Shanghai 3 0 3 
Beijing 0 0 0 
Guangxi 0 0 0 
Hebei 1 0 1 
Shandong 1 0 1 
Hunan 1 0 1 
Jiangsu 1 0 1 
Others 6 0 6 
 Total 21 3 24 







Home 1 0 1 
Factories 1 1 2 
Farms 0 0 0 
Retailers 0 0 0 
Schools 0 0 0 















Figure 2. The current government authorities involved in food safety supervision and 771	










Figure 3. Government food safety information disclosure system in China (Adapted 781	
from Jia & Jukes, 2013; Zhou, 2017) 782	
 783	
 784	























Figure 5. The total number of incidents and reports exposed by government and media 789	




Figure 6. The number of dairy related food safety incidents by government and media 794	




Figure 7. Features of dairy food incidents and reports in 2005 and 2012 
 
 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix: Search terms used 800	
三元纯牛奶 Sanyuan pure milk 婴儿奶粉 baby formula 
不合格奶粉 unqualified milk powder 婴幼儿奶粉 baby formula all stages 
二氧化氯保鲜生奶 chlorine dioxide 
fresh milk 宝宝奶酪 baby cheese 
人造牛奶 artificial milk 惠氏启赋奶粉 Wyeth	illuma	milk powder 
伊利奶粉 Yili milk powder 早产奶 milk power for 
假奶 fake milk 毒奶粉 toxic milk powder 
催奶 lactation 洋奶粉 imported milk powder 
光明鲜奶中漂浮蓝色颗粒物 
floating blue particles in Guangming 
milk 
激素奶 milk with hormone 
劣质奶精 inferior creamer 牛奶 milk 
南山婴儿奶粉 Nanshan baby 
formula 
牛奶中非法添加二氧化氯 illegal addition of chlorine 
dioxide to milk 
喜康宝奶粉 Xikangbao milk powder 牛奶变质 milk deterioration 
奶 milk 牛奶掺牛尿 milk mixed with cow urine 
奶企 dairy enterprise 牛尿奶 cow urine milk 
奶农 dairy farmer 珍珠奶茶 pearl milk tea 
奶油 cream 甲醛奶 formaldehyde milk 
奶牛 cow 皮革奶 leather milk 
奶粉 milk powder 福尔马林奶 formalin in milk 
奶粉、召回 milk powder recall 篡改牛奶出厂日期 tampering with date of milk production 
奶粉养猪 milk powder pig feed 纯牛奶 pure milk 
奶粉造假 milk powder fraud 美素力奶粉 Frisolac milk powder 
奶精 creamer 美赞臣奶粉 Mead Johnson milk powder 
奶茶 milk tea 自制牛奶 homemade milk 
奶酒 cream wine 三聚氰胺 melamine 
奶酒无奶 cream wine no cream 营养酸奶 nutritious yogurt 
奶香精吗啡 cream morphine 酸奶 yogurt 
婴儿 1 段奶粉 baby formula 1 
  801	
	802	
	803	
	804	
